Russell
Hsiao is the Executive Director of the Global Taiwan Institute, a 501(c)(3)
think tank in Washington, DC dedicated to Taiwan policy research. David An is a
Senior Research Fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.
Russell Hsiao是全球台灣研究所的執行董事，位於華盛頓特區的501（c）（3）智囊團，致力於台灣政策研究。
David An是全球台灣研究所的高級研究
“美國優先” 對 “一中” 〈谷歌翻譯 原文於下〉
唐納德•特朗普現在是美國的第四十五任總統。作為世界上最強大民主的總統，特朗普受美國憲法的照顧條款的約束，執行諸如1979年“台灣關係法”等土地法的法律。根據美國憲法所規定的權力分離原則，現在由特朗普總統領導的行政部門負責通過制定政策實施土地法律。
作為總統當選人，特朗普表示，他的政府對外交政策的做法不受以前的行政當局不必要的過時的公約和自我施加的限制約束。他建議重新調整這些政策，以更好地適應二十一世紀的美國利益。的確，總統當選者從民主選舉的台灣領導人
- 美國的一個主要安全夥伴 - 發出祝賀電話，並質疑前政府的中國政策的效力。
儘管公眾強烈抗議，特朗普說，或當選總統改變了美國的政策或法律。此外，特朗普完全在他的合法權利內接電話和“質疑”前政府的政策。
（前奧巴馬總統說，“我認為我們的所有外交政策都應該受到新的眼光。”）此外，即使特朗普總統改變了美國的政策，也沒有任何法律禁止他這樣做。
雖然對所討論的政策已經有了很大的爭論，但對於總統對政策提出質疑的恐懼的危險邏輯的討論很有限。在總統的意見之後，在辯論話語中失去的是承認美國對台政策的法律基礎，它們保持不變，美國“一個中國”政策本身的彈性。
這種反應，即使在專家們的反應中，都是在美國對待兩岸關係的方法中，一個關鍵的盲點。可以肯定的是，美國對台灣的政策在過去四十五年中，以美國的主要利益在於解決台灣海峽兩岸分歧的過程 - 而不是結果
- 為前提。
它本質上是一種被動設計的政策，但是對過程的強調故意放棄了將結果塑造給其他兩個方面的倡議：台灣和中華人民共和國。這是一種方法，一些高級政策制定者在預期的時間將創造一個既成事實，但它提供了華盛頓特區有靈活性適應和應對更廣泛的地緣政治挑戰，同時保持台灣海峽的穩定。
儘管有相反的預期，台灣在接下來的四十年裡蓬勃發展。政府從上而下自由化，而一個積極的民間社會熱切地從底層推動政治改革。台灣從一個專制政府演變成一個充滿活力的民主。對台灣及其民主的支持也在美國境內。
然而，隨著雙方權力差距的擴大，集中於這一進程的政策越來越緊張，使台灣更容易受到脅迫，北京更加勇於使用軍事力量。事實上，中華人民共和國正逐步不斷地向台灣推進自己想要的結果。一直以來，美國對於進程的關注正在以犧牲其價值觀和戰略利益為代價將其引向中國的目標。
一些美國學者和前政策制定者對於通過與北京達成一種新的模式來滿足中國的需要發出了警報，這將有效地拋棄台灣。然而，關於霍布森選擇的辯論掩蓋了一個非常需要的關於台灣戰略的討論，該戰略不僅關注於確保和平進程，而且是對期望結果的願景。
由於台灣海峽兩岸爭取對話，這種以過程為基礎的政策制定方法的範圍，禁止美國決策者積極塑造台灣海峽的條件，更有利於長期的和平與穩定。這種過時和部分缺陷的前提是基於華盛頓在台灣海峽以二元語言建立事件的傾向：獨立或統一。這是一個錯誤的困境，北京已經構成了霍布森的選擇。
確保和平進程的“台灣關係法”（美國與台灣之間的法律關係）規定了美國對兩岸關係的主要目標，即確保該決議“不是強制性的，單方面的或不利於美國利益“。為此，新總統擁有大量工具和法律權威，可以重新調整台灣政策。
“台灣關係法”中的五條規定有助於強調：
·
台灣的未來將由和平手段決定。
·
考慮以非和平手段，包括抵製或禁運，以及對西太平洋地區的和平與安全的威脅以及美國嚴重關切的任何努力來確定台灣的未來。
·
向台灣提供具有防禦性的武器。
·
保持美國抵制任何可能危及台灣人民的安全（或社會或經濟制度）的武力或其他形式的脅迫的能力。
·
維護和增進台灣所有人民的人權，特此重申為美國的目標。
在第二方面，前五角大樓官方和空軍中將馬克•斯托克斯（Mark
Stokes）制定了未來台灣海峽的政策選擇。該報告稱為“台灣海峽的美國和未來政策選擇”，概述了關於台灣政策未來的四個替代學派：住宿學校;現狀學校;規範化學校;美國“一中兩政府”學校。正如斯托克斯在最近的一篇後續文章中精心觀察到的那樣。政策還沒有趕上自1996年以來台灣發生的變化，特別是自2000年第一次和平移交權力以來。
儘管所有的喧囂，新的美國總統
- 與他的偶像形像 - 沒有改變美國的政策。相反，他的政府提出了一個關於目前這種政策方法的長期可行性的重要和根本問題。可以肯定的是，以前的模糊方法已經失去了它的效用，效果是一個鼓舞的北京和台灣，現在正在逐漸被推入一個角落（例如，北京的外交攻勢）。
政策逐步變化的替代方案同樣存在破壞穩定的命題，而且任何變化都帶來了很大的不確定性。但是，對變化的恐懼可能導致癱瘓狀態，在台灣海峽同樣具有破壞性。對這一進程的片面關注使美國的利益越來越容易受到兩岸關係的變幻莫測和北京日益增長的槓桿。事實上，對台灣的政策在過去四十五年中的運作，前提是美國的主要利益在於進程，而不是結果。現在是美國決策者重新關注預期結果的時候了。
Russell Hsiao是全球台灣研究所的執行董事，位於華盛頓特區的501（c）（3）智囊團，致力於台灣政策研究。
David An是全球台灣研究所的高級研究
Donald J. Trump is now the
forty-fifth president of the United States. As president of the world’s strongest democracy, Trump is bound by the Take
Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution to
execute the laws of the land—laws such as the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979. Under the principle of separation
of powers enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution, the executive branch—now headed by President Trump—is responsible for implementing the laws of the land by
formulating policies.
As president-elect, Trump
indicated that his administration’s approach to foreign policy
would not be bound by the outdated conventions and self-imposed restrictions
toed needlessly by previous administrations. He suggested that those policies
would be recalibrated to better suit American interests in the twenty-first
century. Indeed, the president-elect took a congratulatory phone call from the democratically
elected leader of Taiwan—a key security partner of the
United States—and questioned the efficacy of the
former administration’s China policy.
Despite the public outcry,
nothing Trump said or did as president-elect changed U.S. policy or the law.
Also, Trump was completely within his legal rights to take a phone call and “question” the former administration’s policies. (Former president Obama said as much when he stated, “I think all of our foreign
policy should be subject to fresh eyes.”) Additionally, even if President
Trump does change U.S. policy, there is nothing to legally stop him from doing so.
While much fuss has been made about
the policies in question, there has been limited discussion about the dangerous
logic that feeds the fear over the president’s questioning of policy. Lost
in the polemic discourse following the president’s comments is a recognition
of the legal underpinnings of U.S. policies toward Taiwan, which remain ever
constant, and the elasticity of the U.S. “One China” policy itself.
The reaction, even among
experts, was telling and laid bare a critical blind spot in the United States’ approach to cross-Strait relations. To be sure, U.S.
policy towards Taiwan has operated over the past forty-five years on the
premise that America’s primary interest is in the process—as opposed to the outcome—of resolving differences
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
It was inherently a passive
policy by design, but the emphasis on process intentionally ceded the
initiative of shaping the outcome to the two other parties: Taiwan and the
People’s Republic of China. It was an
approach that some senior policymakers at the time expected would create a fait
accompli, yet it provided Washington, DC with the flexibility to adapt and
respond to broader geopolitical challenges while maintaining stability in the Taiwan
Straits.
Despite expectations to the contrary, Taiwan
thrived in the ensuing four decades. The government liberalized from the top
down while an active civil society fervently pushed for political reforms from
the bottom up. Taiwan evolved from an authoritarian government to a vibrant
democracy. Support for Taiwan and its democracy grew within the United States
as well.
As the power disparity between
the two sides widens, however, the policy focused on the process is
increasingly under strain and has left Taiwan more susceptible to coercion and
Beijing more emboldened to use military force. Indeed, the PRC is gradually and
unceasingly pushing toward its own desired outcome for Taiwan. All the while,
America’s focus on process is drawing it
towards China’s objectives at the expense of its
values and strategic interests.
Some American scholars and
former policymakers have sounded the alarm about the need to accommodate China by reaching a new modus vivendiwith Beijing, which will effectively
abandon Taiwan. A debate over a Hobson’s choice, however, obscures a much-needed discussion
about a Taiwan strategy that not only focuses on ensuring a peaceful process
but also a vision for a desired outcome.
As the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait struggle to engage in dialogue, the scope of this process-based approach
to policymaking has barred U.S. policymakers from actively shaping conditions
in the Taiwan Strait that would be more conducive to long-term peace and
stability. This outdated and partly flawed premise of the approach is based on
a Washington tendency to construct events in the Taiwan Strait in binary terms:
independence or unification. That is a false dilemma, which Beijing has framed
as a Hobson’s choice.
On ensuring a peaceful process,
the Taiwan Relations Act—which legally governs
relations between the United States and Taiwan—sets out the primary goal of
U.S. policy towards cross-Strait relations as ensuring that the resolution is “not coercive, unilateral, or detrimental to U.S.
interests.” Towards that end, the new president
has a lot of tools and legal authority at his disposal to recalibrate Taiwan
policy.
•
The future of Taiwan will be determined by
peaceful means.
•
Consider any effort to determine the future of
Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a
threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave
concern to the United States.
•
Provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive
character.
•
Maintain the capacity of the United States to
resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security—or the social or economic system—of the people on Taiwan.
•
The preservation and enhancement of the human
rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the
United States.
On the second prong, former
Pentagon official and Air Force Lt. Col. Mark Stokes mapped out possible future
policy options in the Taiwan Strait. The report, known as The United States and
Future Policy Options in the Taiwan Strait, outlines four alternative schools
of thought on the future of Taiwan policy: The Accommodation School; The Status
Quo School; The Normalization School; and The U.S. “One
China, Two Governments” School. As Stokes astutely
observed in a recent follow-up article, “U.S. policy has yet to catch
up with the changes that have taken place on Taiwan since 1996, especially
since the first peaceful transfer of power in 2000.”
Despite all the uproar, the new
U.S. president—with his iconoclastic persona—has not changed U.S. policy. Rather, his administration
has raised an important and fundamental question about the long-term viability
of this current approach to policy. To be sure, the previous ambiguous approach
has outlived its utility, and the effects have been an emboldened Beijing and a
Taiwan that is now being gradually pushed into a corner (see, e.g., Beijing’s diplomatic offensive).
Alternatives to a gradual
change in policy present equally destabilizing propositions, and there is a
great deal of uncertainty that comes with any change. However, a fear of change
could lead to a state of paralysis that is equally disruptive in the Taiwan
Strait. A one-sided focus on the process has left U.S. interests increasingly
susceptible to the vagaries of cross-Strait relations and Beijing’s increasing leverages. Indeed, policy towards Taiwan has
operated over the past forty-five years on the premise that America’s primary interest is in the process—as opposed to the outcome. It is time for U.S.
policymakers to refocus on a desired outcome.
Russell Hsiao is the Executive
Director of the Global Taiwan Institute, a 501(c)(3) think tank in Washington,
DC dedicated to Taiwan policy research. David An is a Senior Research Fellow at
the Global Taiwan Institute.
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